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As part of the project on the Europeanization of British politics and public policy this Paper undertakes a study of banking, investment and insurance directives as well as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to deal with conceptualizations of Europeanization and assess the impact of this on British financial services regulation. Through this study the Paper allows a comparison with the German institutional structure and identifies similarities regarding the impact of Europeanization on this member state’s financial services sector. The Paper picks up on a number of issues outlined by Bache and Jordan (2004) in terms of top-down or downloading, bottom-up or up-loading, cross-loading and policy transfer procedures of Europeanization. Overall the Paper recognises an interaction between the European Union (EU) and member states in terms of up-loading and downloading and an interaction between member states in the context of cross-loading.

In its most explicit form Europeanization is conceptualized as the process of downloading European Union (EU) directives, regulations and institutional structures to the domestic level. The main conceptualization identified throughout this Paper conceives Europeanization as “the reorientation or reshaping of aspects of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and preferences of European level actors, as advanced through EU initiatives and decisions” (ibid, p 2). This primarily focuses on downloading but does not exclude other conceptualizations of  Europeanization such as up-loading to the EU, cross-loading in the form of vertical policy transfer, shared beliefs, informal and formal rules, discourse, identities and horizontal policy transfer. Initially, this Paper concentrates on downloading, but when explaining policy-making processes, identifies and explains instances of up-loading and cross-loading. Furthermore, this definition allows a distinction between ‘direct Europeanization’ which involves intended impacts and indirect Europeanization which incorporates unforeseen impacts of Europeanization. The Paper also identifies the distinction made by Bache and Jordan (2004) and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) between voluntary Europeanization and coercive Europeanization. This provides a template for the analysis of Europeanization in terms of voluntary direct, involuntary direct, coercive direct and coercive indirect impacts or policy transfer (Bache and Jordan, 2004). This Paper identifies policy transfer in the formulation and dissemination of EU policy in terms of up-loading, downloading and cross-loading. As noted by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) policy transfer “refers to the process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies in another” (p 357). Indeed, the primary purpose of this Paper is to use this framework of policy transfer to assess the impact downloading, has had on British financial services regulation as well as the effects both up-loading and cross-loading have on the formulation of financial services regulation. Overall, this Paper argues that Europeanization involves member states and or a “supranational institution pushing or even forcing another government to adopt a particular policy (ibid, p 344).





A number of academics have argued that Europeanization is a useful concept even though it needed further exploration, explanation and conceptualization. Indeed, Europeanization has been conceptualized in many different ways: see Bomberg and Peterson, (2000), Börzel, (1999; 2002), Börzel and Risse (2000), Buller and Gamble (2002), Bulmer and Burch (2001), Dyson (2000; 2002), Dyson and Goetz (2002), Featherstone and Kazamias (2001), George, (2001), Goetz and Hix (2000), Howell, (2004a; 2004b), Ladrech (1994), Olsen (2002), Radaelli (2000), Risse et al (2001). Dyson (2002) explained, “Europeanization remains a relatively new theoretical interest and has produced more questions than answers” (p 3). In the same fashion Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) proposed that Europeanization was a “dynamic process unfolding over time” and through complex interactive variables it provided contradictory, divergent and contingent effects. However, they ultimately argued that Europeanization included both domestic and EU levels of policy-making and stressed the interdependence between the two. They ‘focus’ on the expansion of EU institutions and their policy-making capabilities as well as changes in member states based on such expansions. In other words, concentration on downloading alone was insufficient and both up-loading and cross-loading needed to be considered in an understanding of the EU as process.

Finally, there are wider interpretations of Europeanization that consider it to include, “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000; p 4; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004 p???). However, these broad definitions lead to an inclusive conceptualization of Europeanization and broker criticisms of ‘conceptual stretching’. In this context, Radaelli (2000) argued that Europeanization was difficult to define because, if all things have been touched by Europe, to some extent or other, all things have been Europeanized. It eventually becomes all things to all people and to some extent almost meaningless. This Paper recognises the problem conceptual stretching creates and identifies specific forms of Europeanization in the forms of downloading up-loading and cross-loading. Indeed, these forms can be used to explain further the framework outlined by Bache and Jordan (2004) in terms of direct, indirect, voluntary and coercive impacts on member states. The extent that downloaded policy will incorporate voluntary or coercive impacts will be influenced by the success or failure in downloading. Furthermore, those policy issues not completely dealt with in the context of direct impacts will take the form of indirect impacts which can either be processed through further up-loading (if necessary) or cross-loading. Consequently, because the Paper deals with these conceptualizations of Europeanization each will need a short explanation in relation to different types of impacts of Europeanization.

Downloading and Impacts of Europeanization

Ladrech (1994) argued that Europeanization occurred when EU political dynamics became part of the logic and norms of domestic policy-making. He defined Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making” (p 70). This necessitated a process of downloading or top-down procedures, which following some discussion was ultimately forwarded by Börzel and Risse (2000), Buller and Gamble (2002), Hix and Goetz (2000) and George (2001). George (2001) acknowledged that the interpretation of “Europeanization … is only part of a larger … two way process” (p 1) but his focus was on the impact of the EU on the UK system. Buller and Gamble (2002) also explored wider conceptualizations of Europeanization but ultimately considered it to be “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics” (p 17). Overall, the main emphasis for these conceptualizations of Europeanization was a concentration on the downloading from a top-down perspective or EU effects on domestic policies etc. In a similar way, Hix and Goetz (2000) identified European integration as an independent variable and change in domestic systems or Europeanization as the dependent variable. This is a useful distinction if Europeanization is the outcome of change at the domestic level; however, if the domestic level initiates change in the EU and affects European integration then the variables are reversed. These conceptualizations mainly concentrate on direct and indirect voluntary impacts have some difficulty in explaining direct and indirect coercive impacts. Fundamentally this approach has problems explaining why opposition may or may not exist or why there may be spill-over consequences or indirect coercive impacts in relation to this. To fully comprehend the relationships between the separate parts of the framework we need to understand the relationships between downloading, up-loading and cross-loading.

Up-loading and Cross-loading and Impacts of Europeanization

Risse et al (2001) identified both downloading and up-loading when they perceived Europeanization as the “emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules” (p 3). The emphasis on ‘emergence and development’ identifies the Europeanization process as one of up-loading in the development of EU institutions and downloading in terms of ‘authoritative European rules’. Indeed, the emphasis on the creation of rules at the EU level moves away from a utilization of Europeanization as purely downloading to one that entails “the evolution of European institutions that impact on political processes and structures of the member states” (Börzel, 2002; p 193). Overall, Europeanization incorporates an interactive process in that it involves bottom-up and top-down procedures. Furthermore, Börzel (2003) noted that the interaction between these dimensions may be investigated through the actions of national governments. Arguments developed in this Paper agree with this position, but considers that up-loading is not simply undertaken at the national or macro level but that sub-national actors are also involved in micro up-loading. 

As with up-loading, cross-loading involves both macro and micro procedures; the former involving intergovernmental procedures and governments learning from each other, the latter sub-national interaction and learning through group intermediation. Furthermore, problematic issues arise when we look at cross-loading and its links with policy transfer. Indeed, to overcome these difficulties in terms of ‘conceptual stretching’ and the extent policy transfer can be considered Europeanization this Paper identifies a distinction between horizontal and vertical policy transfer.





Europeanization and Policy Transfer

HPT = impetus for policy change can begin in this way but would not ordinarily have been adopted by supranational structures:
HPT ----> Up-loading ----> Downloading ----> VPT/Cross-loading

VPT = impetus for policy is likely to be an outcome of Up-loading and Downloading:
Up-loading ----> Downloading ----> VPT/Cross-loading

But may again precipitate further up-loading through the formation of shared beliefs, norms, discourse, learning etc (content):
VPT/Cross-loading ----> Up-loading ----> Downloading
Horizontal Policy Transfer (HPT) – Vertical Policy Transfer (VPT)


In many policy domains HPT could be seen as the trigger for change and may only occur during the initial phase of policy transfer throughout the EU. In this context, once convergence has been kick-started and the process begun then outcomes of downloading would be VPT/cross-loading unless a sector or government saw deficiencies in the policy issue and successfully transferred changes through HPT to other member states which were then up-loaded and downloaded. Again however, it is likely that any further Europeanization regarding this issue would involve VPT/cross-loading. Consequently, this study will identify cross-loading as VPT, because for Europeanization to take place policy necessities an explicit EU dimension. Each of these areas has an impact on direct, indirect voluntary and involuntary types of Europeanization. For instance, the level of success in up-loading on a micro and macro level will determine the extent that member state governments or sectors will voluntary accept or need to be coerced when implementing policies. Furthermore the greater the involvement of member states in up-loading procedures the less likelihood of indirect rather than direct impacts. Indeed, through cross-loading and up-loading coercive and indirect Europeanization may be minimized and managed. Overall, Europeanization involves downloading, up-loading and cross-loading and through a study of British financial services the next section of the paper looks at these distinctions and the interactions between them in more detail.

Downloading, Up-loading and Cross-loading: Examining British Financial Services

The British government and financial services industry understood the importance of a single market in financial products and underpinned Margaret Thatcher’s willingness to sign the SEA. However, the British considered that a liberal market structure and self regulation would best suit the EU and provide a competitive environment for financial services. Furthermore other financial services industries throughout the EU had different perspectives when it came to the best regulatory structure and attempted both macro and micro up-loading to deal with this. Consequently, separate parts of directives were more or less amenable to different member states. For instance, the UK industry pursued a liberal structure whereas the German industry pushed for greater regulation (see Howell, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2004a). Indeed, these differences provide different examples of Europeanization in terms of voluntary, coercive, direct and indirect impacts once directives have been agreed. Different member state interpretations of directives provide diversity which move from the straight forward direct voluntary impacts toward indirect and if necessary coercive impacts.

In the early 1980s the British industry was primarily supervised through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) with regulation revolving around solvency control, which relied on the principle of ‘freedom with disclosure’. Following the Conservative deregulation of the British industry through the Financial Services Act (1986), overall control moved to the Treasury but their involvement was limited and regulation was implemented through the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs). There were four main SROs, which were answerable to SIB: the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), the Investment Management Regulatory Organization (IMRO), the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organization (LAUTRO) and the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA). On top of this, some functions of banks and building societies were regulated by SROs and others by the Bank of England and the Building Societies Commission respectively. Furthermore, Recognised Investment Exchanges (RIEs) were regulated by SIB and the Bank of England, Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs) by SIB and professional firms by both Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs) and SROs both of which were answerable to the SIB. In a practical context, this meant that independent advisers were regulated by the SFA, IMRO and FIMBRA; and unit trust management companies by the SFA, IMRO and LAUTRO, which caused confusion for the consumer, company and regulator. The complicated structure and limited co-operation between regulators led to issues of under-regulation in terms of mis-selling and bad advice. Following these difficulties and EU directives in 1995 there were attempts to clarify the process when LAUTRO and FIMBRA were merged into the Personal Investment Authority (PIA). Such action was outlined in financial services directives and this was a direct voluntary impact of Europeanization on British financial services. However, these moves did little to deal with the overlapping of competences regarding the supervision of the sector. The regulatory structure was supposed to ensure efficient expert regulation however, the problem was that although these bodies were independent in name they were closely tied to the financial services sector and may have been ‘captured’? Effectively, those involved in government and the industry were only prepared to regulate to this level and the industry if not the new labour government was to experience the indirect consequences of a SEM in financial services. Indeed, in an attempt to move away from self-regulation and the problems of capture a statutory independent authority was initiated in 1997; the Financial Services Authority (FSA). This Paper considers that through the formation of the SEM, downloaded EU policy initiated impacts on this rather confusing structure: initially, direct and indirect voluntary and ultimately direct and indirect coercive impacts.

For instance, initially member states agreed to direct voluntary procedures in the form of two co-ordination directives which have changed the European banking sector. The First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC) cleared many obstacles to the freedom of establishment for banks and other credit institutions, introduced home country supervision and a common position for the granting of banking licences. However, problems were still apparent and certain obstacles needed to be removed before a genuine single market in banking could be achieved. Indeed, member states lobbied for further integration through up-loading and established further directives in the quest for a single market in financial services. The Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) aimed for the removal of authorization problems e.g. 12 different supervisors, a definition of banking activities and cross-border trade. It enabled a single banking licence; a list of banking activities and minimum capital levels (5m ECU, now euros, laid down for new banks). The directive also provided supervisory rules in terms of internal management, audit systems and control levels of major shareholders. Furthermore, once banks could trade cross-border other credit institutions lobbied for a level playing field in financial services. The directive on Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (CAD) provided the framework for the Investment Services Directive (ISD) (93/22/EEC) both directives attempted to create an internal market in investment services and give all institutions, whether credit or investment firms, the ability to offer investment services throughout the EU. 

In other parts of the sector further up-loading and downloading and direct voluntary Europeanization can be observed in the formulation and implementation of the Co-Insurance Directive (78/473/EEC), the Credit and Suretyship Assurance Directive amending Directive (87/343/EEC), and the Legal Expenses Directive (87/344/EEC). Later, more specific, directives include the Council Directive on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings (AACAIU) (91/674/EEC) and the Council Directive setting up an Insurance Committee (IC) (91/675/EEC). The IC acts as an intermediary between the industry and the Commission and assists in implementation procedures. The IC also examines any questions relating to the application of existing directives and the preparation of new legislation proposals in the insurance sector. 

In the UK direct and indirect voluntary impacts but more explicitly direct voluntary impacts can be observed when the First Non-Life Insurance Directive (1973) was downloaded through the Consolidated Insurance Companies Act (1974) and the First Life Assurance Directive (1979) through the Insurance Companies Act (1982). Again these impacts can be observed when the Second and Third generations of insurance/assurance directives were downloaded through the Insurance Companies Act (1994) and along with aspects of the Second Banking Directive (1989) through the Financial Services and Marketing Act (FSMA) (2000). However, member state industries including Britain’s diverse interpretations meant that problems still existed in terms of insurance, banking and securities and capital markets and further up-loading, downloading was still apparent and ongoing in the financial services sector.

Fundamentally, banking legislation and its’ consequent regulation necessitated legislation in other financial services industries. This process is illustrated by the interaction between security markets and banking and may be seen as indirect voluntary and in some instances indirect coercive examples of Europeanization. Furthermore, one may consider that this is an example up-loading by the individual industries to the EU, where directives are formulated and ultimately downloaded to member states. This may be made a little clearer through a study of the Third Life Assurance Directive in particular.

The Third Life Assurance Directive

Through three generations insurance directives provide examples of up-loading, downloading and cross-loading and a mix of direct, indirect, voluntary and coercive impacts. Up-loading identifies integration whereas paradoxically downloading involves diversity of interpretation through different types of impact. Indeed, in one member state a directive may be implemented in a direct and voluntary fashion whereas in another different strategies may be needed. In its proposal for a Third Life Assurance Directive, the European Commission made clear that “the internal market in insurance represented a primary goal … in view of the importance of this strongly expanding sector” (Com 91 57 final SYN; 329, p 2). The insurance industry considered that it needed priority treatment because it lagged behind the liberalization of the other industries within the financial services sector. Directives in the banking industry had already been implemented, and as a consequence the insurance industry had been left at a competitive disadvantage (examples of up-loading). This may be interpreted as indirect voluntary and coercive spill-over consequences of directive implementation.

As with banking directives, insurance directives outlined a ‘competent authority’ to introduce appropriate safeguards and prevent “irregularities and infringements of the provisions of assurance supervision” (OJ 360; Art, 10). Indeed, the Third Life Insurance Directive indicated that member states must have an institution capable of ensuring the “orderly pursuit of business by insurance undertakings” (ibid).  Through the SEM, consumers will have wider choice; however, they must be provided with enough information to allow choices best suited to their needs. Such information is all the more important when the contract is of a long-term nature. Consequently, the consumer should receive clear and accurate information regarding the ‘essential character of the products proposed’ (ibid; Art, 23) and an accurately defined complaints procedure. Furthermore, in the Second Banking Directive the ‘competent authority’ for credit institutions should provide authorization in terms of capital and sound prudent management (Art, 5).

The Third Life Assurance Directive identified what a regulated market should involve. It included regulations approved by ‘competent authorities’; those which the national authorities empowered to supervise insurance undertakings. In the context of the Britain this was the FSA. Furthermore, ‘competent authorities’ may also restrict authorization of both companies and products (Third Life Assurance Directive; Art, 4). So when the FSA gives authorization for classes of insurance or companies it is valid for the entire EU. Competent authorities encompass member state authorities that are statutorily empowered to supervise financial service undertakings and are able to grant and withhold authorization. The competent authority will ensure minimum guarantees and individuals of good repute manage companies. Furthermore, it will carry out verification and authorization of company’s ability to trade in other member states (this may be accomplished with the assistance of the member state authority in which the company trades) (ibid; Arts, 5 and 9). However the “financial supervision of an assurance undertaking … shall be the sole responsibility of the home member state. If the ‘competent authorities’ of the member state of the commitment have reason to consider that the activities of an assurance undertaking might affect its financial soundness, they should inform the competent authorities of the home member state. The latter authorities shall determine whether the undertaking is complying with the prudential principles laid down in this Directive” (ibid; Art 8, Para 1). Supervision incorporates levels of solvency, and technical provisions, both mathematical and assets covering these provisions in relation to regulations indicated by the member state based on principles outlined in the directive. Overall the “competent authorities … shall require every assurance undertaking to have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms” (ibid; Art 8, Para 3).

Each member state would need to ensure that its ‘competent authority’ is able to carry out the supervision of companies with head offices in their territories, which includes business in other member states. The ‘competent authority’ should have the powers to ensure that council directives are implemented. In a practical context, this means the ability to investigate an undertaking in terms of all of its business on the spot and insist on documentation being made immediately available.  The ‘competent authority’ also needed to ensure consumer protection in all member states and have the means of enforcement at its disposal. It may also make provision for the “competent authorities to obtain any information regarding contracts which are held by intermediaries” (ibid; Art 10, Para C). Indeed, at an ECO/FIN Council meeting on 23 Nov 1992 Leo Brittan argued that the system of home country control and consolidated supervision could be strengthened and clarified, particularly with reference to: the transparency of group structures, greater exchange of information between supervisory authorities, the role of external auditors and intensified co-operation between international prudential supervisors. In each instance voluntary direct Europeanization can become direct and coercive for member state industries as well indirect voluntary and indirect coercive. The form of Europeanization in this context will rely on the member state structure pre-directive and the level of success in up-loading during the negotiation of the directive. If member state disagreements with indirect consequences are to great then further cross-loading and up-loading will ensue. 

During the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive, up-loading processes were continually in motion and as noted parts of it could have been met by the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) and other regulatory structures. However, considering the tasks necessary to supervise cross-border, and the model of an independent central bank one supervisory institution best fitted the bill. Some issues outlined in the directive would be better served by a single institution, which identified an element of misfit for the UK structure (McGee and Heusel, 1995; p 85). Even though up-loading was successful downloading necessitated institutional change and Britain along with other member states e.g. Germany moved toward a single regulator, a model that seems to provide best fit for EU legislation regarding financial services in general. In each case direct voluntary Europeanization involves indirect voluntary and in some instances coercive aspects of Europeanization.

This Paper has argued that through up-loading, downloading from the EU begins to provide a platform for cross-loading e.g. the FSA identifying models for future EU market and supervisory structures. This has implications for consumers throughout the EU but in the UK provides the basis for a concerted rearrangement of financial services commercial practice. Through the realisation of the FSA it could be argued that consumer protection in the UK was more rigorous as complaints procedures and institutional process became more transparent. Consequently, there were winners and losers once the new legislation had been implemented the losers financial services companies in terms of profitability and fines, the winners were the consumers. In the disarray of the old UK regulatory structure we find traces of ‘capture’ in the new we find transparency and accountability. Of course one may argue that national variables and globalization, rather than Europeanization, were the impetus behind the creation of the FSA as competent authority. This given the next section of this Paper outlines and examines the links between the directives and the British ‘competent authority’; the FSA.

The British Competent Authority: the FSA 

As outlined in the directives the FSA aimed to promote public understanding and maintain confidence in the financial system. This may be achieved through ensuring the right balance of consumer protection in terms of vetting entry and helping to reduce financial crime. The FSA attempted to ensure these objectives in an efficient and responsible manner with a balance between the burden to the firm and benefits to the consumer. Indeed, protection was balanced so as to ensure innovation and competition between companies. This in turn should have ensured competitive UK financial services in the international environment. The PIA dealt with many of these issues, but failed to deal with some fundamental problems in terms of intermediaries, commission and expertise. Again as identified in the directives through the authorization of companies the FSA is dealing with these issues as well as consolidating financial services supervision. In this context, we are locating specific examples of downloading and the differentiation between fit and misfit in terms of insurance regulation. 

Furthermore, the directives identify issues relating to consumer confidence which the FSA ensures through stipulating adequate resources, fit and proper individuals in management,  fair treatment at point of sale and clear on-going information e.g. performance indicators. Overall, the FSA investigated unauthorized activities and where necessary fairness in marketing and advertising. It is also dealing with mortgage endowment policies and issues of redress. These could be noted as examples of downloading, however; the European Bureau of Consumers Union (BEUC) argued that there is limited access to the SEM because of diverse consumer protection rules. Consumers who purchase policies through insurance companies from other member states will not know under whose jurisdiction the contract resided and not have adequate protection (McGee and Heusel, 1995). The membership of BEUC (member state consumer groups) up-loads these concerns too the EU through the pressure group and promotes the harmonization of insurance contract law and that this  be downloaded to member states.

Through downloading and direct and indirect voluntary and coercive impacts, the FSA has taken on further duties. Following the Insurance Mediation Directive it is now responsible for the regulation of the sales of insurance products, including home and car policies. Additional responsibilities include the regulation of mutual societies, unfair terms in financial services contracts, Lloyd’s insurance market, market abuse and applications and supervision of overseas investment exchanges. This of course relies on the effective supervision of investment exchanges and financial services in other states or effective downloading throughout the EU. Of course, different cultural models will identify different interpretations of the directives and this leads to diversification in the EU. As noted above, even though up-loading and European integration provide unification, the downloading procedures allow flexibility of interpretation and consequent diversity. This provides member states with the opportunity to implement direct voluntary and coercive impacts which may lead to indirect voluntary and coercive impacts. For instance the British financial services sector had needed to accept the implementation of the FSA which it was initially opposed. Even though micro up-loading and compromise indicated the need for such an institution it did not mean that the exact structure had been agreed. 

With regard to the British financial sector’s misgivings the FSA moved cautiously with respect to regulation so as not to create barriers for business. Indeed, whilst still ensuring its regulatory objectives, it has consulted with the market at every juncture. Davies (2000) thought that structures needed to be developed in response to changing markets at the national, European and international levels. Financial markets are not confined by national boundaries, especially in the context of the EU. Furthermore, the EU priority should be an “overhaul of the financial services legislative framework … for promulgating and amending directives were quite inadequate to deal with fast moving financial markets” (Davies, 2000a; p 1). 

Howard Davies did not specifically argue for a single regulator for securities or banking, as this would be premature given the diversity that still existed regarding regulation and cultural interpretation. This given, he stated that in relation to security markets, “without harmonized regulation, or the ability to enforce its regulations, a pan-European securities regulator would be ineffective” (ibid, p 3). This does suggest that if regulation was harmonized, and a pan-European regulator was able to enforce its regulations, then such an institution would be effective. However, there would also be accountability problems concerning the European Parliament, European Commission and member states' governments, as well as a contradiction with the principle of subsidiarity. Howard Davies thought similar arguments applied to banking, and that as with most sectors in the EU, supervision should be enforced through regulatory networks under a common legislative framework (see Davies, 2000 and 2000a). These are further examples of the FSA not only acting as a regulator in terms of downloading but because of a concern for the regulatory structure emerging in the EU it begins to cross-load its own perception of acceptable future scenarios and developments. This illustrates the spill-over effects of direct voluntary and direct coercive impacts which eventually through cross-loading and up-loading can once again turn up in the European domain. As noted above, for analytical purposes it is useful to explain the process in the context of specific situations. However, at the edges the situations become blurred as they meld into one another and indicate the process. In part the FSA is an example of downloading from the EU in terms of direct and indirect voluntary as well as direct and indirect coercive impacts. The FSA did not need to take this form but the structure does allow it to deal with stipulations outlined by directives in an efficient and effective manner. It is also an example of up-loading and cross-loading whereby it is involved in discussions regarding inputs to EU legislation and activities relating to European integration. Overall, the EU financial services market still fails to deliver its full potential. In this way the FSA attempts to cross-load a specific model regarding supervision and the future of financial services in the EU. As an outcome of up-loading and downloading the FSA has become part of the process and cross-loads policy preferences throughout the EU. 

If a SEM in financial services is to be realized, a number of trade-offs need to be realized; for instance what should be the balance between competition, innovation and consumer protection?  If regulation drives business offshore it may negate consumer benefit. To what extent should market integrity be promoted even though it costs borrowers and lenders? Overall, the answers to these problems will be different for member states and depend on the sophistication of their financial system, again emphasizing, that different interpretations of policy outcomes will be implemented by individual member states. However, implementation should be in line with EU policy. Some member states have been failing to implement or approve laws in financial services. Such considerations motivated the UK government to support claims by the European Commission that it needed more powers to force rogue member states to implement EU policy. Without these powers, the Commission argued that the SEM would miss its target and fail to become the most competitive economy in the world by 2010 (Financial Times, 2003; p 8). Indeed, if Brussels were provided with more powers to enforce EU policy implementation, downloading, cross-loading and up-loading would intensify and diversity would be limited. In these instances there has been minimal direct impact and in some instances dominant member state actors have stopped correct implementation. Sometimes these issues are dealt with through both voluntary and coercive indirect impacts that emanate through cross-loading or beyond the member state. However, it is not always those that have failed to implement directives that may be affected by cross-loading, as may be seen in the following section Germany has followed its own interpretation of directives and following cross-loading and indirect impacts implemented a structure similar to Britain.

Europeanization and German Financial Services Regulation

In contrast with the British financial services structure there has been a preponderance of liberalization in the German system. However, Hans Eichel the German Finance minister in 2003 considered that in liberalising its markets Germany also realised the necessity for strong regulation to ensure fair play. Initially, there was minimal change to the German structure but in 2002 a major overhaul was completed. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFIN), an institution similar to the FSA, was established in April 2002 and took over supervision of banking, insurance and security markets. In May 2002 it took over the former functions of the supervisory authorities for banking (BAKred), securities (BAWe) and insurance (BAV). Consequently, BaFin is now the single regulator for German financial services in terms of solvency, supervision and consumer protection. The reasons for this change are uncertain and indicated some of the difficulties distinguishing between cross-loading, downloading and up-loading. In both instances of policy changes direct voluntary impacts may best explain the policy transfer process. The first example of policy transfer illustrating downloading and the second cross-loading.
 
This Paper argues that there were a number of reasons for the formation of a single regulator in terms of the integration of financial products and cross-sectoral strategies. This is illustrated in other member states, which over the last few years have “established modern integrated supervisory structures”(BaFIN, 2002; p 2). BaFIN was instituted to provide effective comprehensive supervision and avoid competitive imbalances that a fragmented regulatory structure could precipitate. Because the regulator is responsible for all market participants it falls into the category of the ‘competent authority’ outlined by recent financial services directives. Indeed, BaFIN simplified the German regulatory structure which meant that it limited the number of supervisory offices external member state companies needed to deal with when entering the market and more importantly, it facilitated information between other member state regulators and kept contact with other member state companies to a minimum. Furthermore a unified regulator not only offered an explicit point of contact for other member state regulators it also provided distinct representation at the European and international levels. The new German regulator will carry more weight in international supervisory forums and as a result German interests can be represented more effectively at an international level. In relation to the EU this may take the form of micro up-loading or cross-loading. 

In terms of downloading, the Banking Act (1998) amendments outlined the role for BaFin when it stated that, “when supervising institutions which conduct banking business or provide financial services in another state of the European Economic Area and when supervising institutions as provided in the Banking Directive, the Federal financial Supervisory Authority … shall co-operate with the competent authorities of the state concerned” (Ibid, Division 2, Section 8, Para 3)  If BaFIN stopped a company from undertaking business in Germany, it would need to inform the ‘competent authorities’ of other states where the company has business and identify the measures it was intending to take to terminate these infringements (ibid; Section 8, Para 4). Furthermore, BaFIN may not supervise a group of institutions if it is, 

domiciled in another state of the European Economic Area, in that other state, is included in supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with the banking Directive, or in the case of financial holdings these groups are supervised on a consolidated basis in accordance with the Banking Directives by the ‘competent authorities’ of another state of the European Economic Area. A precondition of such exemption is an agreement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority with the competent authorities of the other state. The Commission of the European Communities is to be informed of the existence and contents of such agreements (ibid, Section, 8a). 

The Banking Act also outlines financial obligations of institutions in terms of ‘assets entrusted to them’ and ‘adequate own funds’. In accordance with legislation indicated by the EU relating to these areas the “Federal Ministry of Finance shall draw up solvency principles by which the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority will, in normal cases, assess whether the requirements … have been satisfied (ibid; Part, 2, Division 1, Section 10, Para 1). Fundamentally, approval of a company must be compatible with “the framework laid down by European Community legislation” (ibid; Para, 1b).

In this way we can observe downloading from the EU through the Banking Act (1998). Indeed the Act initially dealt with many of the issues outlined in financial service directives and further amendments have dealt with arising issues from new EU directives. For instance the amendment regarding insolvency and banking law, of article 3 in December 1999, specifically dealt with the directive on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (Directive 98/26/EC, see OJ No L 166 p 45). Further amendments have dealt with legislation relating to ‘competent authorities’ as noted above amendment April 2002 and financial obligations.





The EU “promotes comparison … so that member states can become aware of what their competitors are doing and decide which elements of foreign programs they may wish to copy and adapt” (Rose, 1993; p 105, cited in Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; p 346). This fails to deal with coercive aspects of policy transfer in terms of downloading unpopular policies from the EU. These policies may mean that up-loading member state preferences was minimal or that a certain member state government uses the EU to implement unpopular policies that it would also wish to implement.  Europeanization can be understood as policy transfer in terms of downloading, up-loading or cross-loading. This means that at different times the emphasis on Europeanization will either be based around mechanisms of change in terms of up-loading from the domestic to the EU level, cross-loading through vertical policy transfer or downloading from the EU to the domestic level. Indeed, the success of the member state in terms of up-loading will have implications when it comes to downloading in respect of impacts and change on the domestic environment. The success in up-loading will affect misfit and consequently have an impact on downloading in the context of fit. One may argue that this is why in most instances each form of Europeanization needs to be included in an explanation of EU policy-making processes. 

In the context of financial services there is up-loading and downloading as well as cross-loading in the formulation of directives and the market place. However, when these different parts of the process are identified it is difficult to break them down as each overlaps the other. This may be seen clearly when we look at the Third Life Assurance Directive, ‘competent authorities’ and the FSA. An SEM in financial services had been under construction through numerous generations of directives in banking, insurance and investment services. And when we examine the incremental formulation of the market we have a good example of the ongoing interaction between up-loading, downloading and cross-loading.  Directives are formulated through up-loading then downloaded to member states where different interpretations of policies are implemented. Unification does take place but, paradoxically there is room for cultural diversity this can then be dealt with through cross-loading and/or further up-loading. 

To enable a structured SEM the EU needed an integrated structure of member state ‘competent authorities’. The directives identified such a structure and from these the UK interpretation encompassed the single regulator model of the FSA. Following the initial directives which were accepted by the EU financial services sector in the UK we observe direct voluntary as well as indirect voluntary transfer. In the UK the FSA was implemented by the UK government with some opposition from the financial services sector and may identify aspects of direct coercive and subsequently indirect coercive transfer. However, given the problems regarding supervision that the UK industry faced and the confused nature of the structure major overhaul was accepted. 
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